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Abstract
Crowdsourcing contests have become widely adopted
for idea generation and problem-solving in various
companies in different industries. The success of
crowdsourcing depends on the sustained participation
and quality-submissions of the individuals. Yet, little is
known about the factors that influence individuals’
continued participation in these contests. We address
this issue, by conducting an empirical study using data
from an online crowdsourcing contest platform,
Kaggle, which delivers data science and machine
learning solutions and models to its clients. The
findings show that the community activities and team
activities do not contribute to motivating the continued
participation, but tenure does significantly affect the
continued participation. We also found statistically
significant effects of amount of prize, number of
competitions, previous team performance, and
competition duration on individuals sustained
participation in crowdsourcing contests. This
research contributes to the literature by identifying the
factors
influencing
individuals’
sustained
participation in crowdsourcing contests.

1. Introduction
Crowdsourcing has hundreds of years of history
which started with the British Government’s “The
Longitude Problem” in 1714 [1]. There are other
examples of Crowdsourcing in the history such as
Oxford English Dictionary’s “cataloging words by the
crowd” in 1884, Toyota’s “Logo Contest” in 1936, and
The Sydney Opera House’s “Architectural Contest” in
1955. In all of these examples, crowds of people have
been used to solve a problem. The idea of
crowdsourcing has been existed for a long time, but its
usage increased after the evolution of Web 2.0 and
Web 3.0 technologies. Web 2.0 enables organizations
to have access to a large-scale workforces in order to
use the power of the crowd to get their tasks done [2].
In the early 2000s, collective intelligence started to
gain recognition. During this period, a lot of processes,
not yet termed crowdsourcing, launched that
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harnessed the efforts of a crowd of people for various
tasks from innovation to implementation. Examples
include iStockphoto and Threadless in 2000,
InnoCentive and TopCoder in 2001, Amazon
Mechanical Turk and Kodak’s “Go for the Gold”
contest in 2005.
In 2006, Jeff Howe, the editor at Wired
magazine, coined the term “crowdsourcing” in his
article “The Rise of Crowdsourcing” that
revolutionized the idea of crowdsourcing. Their
definitions of crowdsourcing is as follows:
“Crowdsourcing is the act of taking a job
traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually
an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined,
generally large group of people in the form of an open
call”[3].
Various crowdsourcing mechanisms are being
used by companies [4], [5]. Some crowdsourcing
platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, allow an
individual to be the only provider of the solution [6],
some crowdsourcing platforms, such as TopCoder,
Kaggle, and TaskCn, are structured as contests to
allow more people to provide solutions.
In
crowdsourcing contests, any user can submit solutions
to the task, but the participant who has provided the
solution of the highest quality is awarded [7], [8].
Some of the crowdsourcing platforms have both
collaborative and competitive elements [9]. These
platforms allow the individuals to simultaneously
collaborate and compete with each other.
Companies
are
increasingly
using
crowdsourcing contests for solving problems, yet the
success and sustainment of these crowdsourcing
contests depend on individuals’ continued
participation and high quality submissions. Previous
research on crowdsourcing has paid considerable
attention to crowdsourcing contests and more
specifically to individuals’ behavior within these
contests. This stream of research mainly focuses on
identifying the factors that motivate individuals to join
the competition and the factors that affect their
performance in these competitions. Yet, very few
studies have investigated individuals’ sustained
participation in these platforms. None of these studies
have examined how individuals’ prior participation
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experience in competitions and their knowledge
sharing activities in the community affect their
continued participation in crowdsourcing contests.
This study aims to address this research gap by using
data collected from Kaggle.com, a Web-based
platform which delivers data science solutions and
models to its clients through problem solving contests.
Kaggle platform has both collaborative and
competitive environment in which individuals can
team up and compete against the other teams in the
competitions. Moreover, individuals within a team can
communicate and share knowledge with the other
members in the community. This simultaneous
collaboration and competition environment makes
Kaggle unique among the other platforms.
The objective of this study is to determine the
factors affecting individuals’ sustained participation in
crowdsourcing contests. The results of this study point
to the important factors affecting individuals’
continued participation in the crowdsourcing contests.
The motivation for individuals’ sustained participation
in the contests is different from that of the community.
The findings show that community activities and team
activities do not contribute to motivating individuals’
continued participation, but tenure is a significant
factor that affects individuals’ sustained participation.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows;
section 2 contains the literature review for individuals’
participation behavior in crowdsourcing; section 3
illustrates the theoretical background and develops the
hypotheses; section 4 explains the data collection and
variable measurement in this study; section 5 applies a
negative binomial model and ordinal logistic
regression for comparing and enhancing the findings
that we obtained in this study; section 6 provides a
conclusions
and
implications
for
helping
crowdsourcing platform sponsors to design
crowdsourcing contests in a way to facilitate
crowdsourcing processes and motivate individuals to
participate.

2. Literature
Previous research in crowdsourcing investigated
three different components of crowdsourcing process:
requesters, crowdsourcing platforms, and solvers.
Some research in crowdsourcing focuses on the
requesters’ and crowdsourcing sponsors’ attitudes and
behavior toward crowdsourcing, including: the
motivation for crowdsourcing, the crowdsourcing
mechanism, organizing the crowdsourcing process,
the types of the tasks to crowdsource, the strategy for
choosing the best solution, and the quality assurance
of the solutions [10], [11]. Another stream of research
focus on the individuals’ (solvers) attitudes and

behavior in crowdsourcing platforms including: the
motivations for initial participation, the motivations
for continued participation, and the factors affecting
their performance [7], [10]–[12]. Understanding the
solvers’ (or individuals) behavior is very important
since it can help crowdsourcing sponsors to use
appropriate mechanisms and strategies to build
successful crowdsourcing platforms.
Many research studies have focused on
individuals’ motivational factors for participation in
crowdsourcing. Djelassi and Decoopman stated that
the type of incentive depends on the type and
mechanisms of crowdsourcing [13]. Previous research
has applied theoretical lenses from various reference
disciplines. The most notable theoretical lens is
motivation theory (classic motivation theory and work
motivation theory) [14]. Most of these studies
drawing on motivation theory investigated the
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for participation in
crowdsourcing contests [15]. Scholars of motivation
and self-determination theory distinguish intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation based on different reasons or
goals that give rise to an action [16]. Intrinsic
motivation “refers to doing something because it is
inherently interesting or enjoyable” and extrinsic
motivation “refers to doing something because it leads
to separable outcome” [16]. Intrinsic motivation has
two components: enjoyment based motivation and
community based motivation; extrinsic motivation has
three components: immediate payoffs, delayed
payoffs, and social motivation [14].
Kaufman et al. in their study on 431 workers of
Amazon Mechanical Turk indicated that the extrinsic
motivation categories (immediate payoffs, delayed
payoffs, social motivation) have a significant effect on
the time individuals spent on the platform. They found
that intrinsic motivation (fun, enjoyment, social
interaction) is more important for some individuals to
join and spent time in the platform [14]. Kazai et al.
found that individuals with higher-order intrinsic
factors such as fortune and fulfilment provide highquality work while individuals with lower-order
intrinsic/extrinsic factors such as fun and fame provide
low-quality work [17]. One of the important
motivational factors (and also design features) that
have been examined in the literature is monetary
awards. Archak in his study on a multiple
simultaneous crowdsourcing contest (TopCoder)
found that project payment is a significant determinant
of the final project quality [7]. On the other hand
Walter and Back in their empirical study on an idea
contest (Atizo) found that monetary incentives only
have an effect on the quantity of submitted ideas, not
on the quality [18]. While Yang et al. in one of their
study on Taskcn found that monetary awards are not a
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significant incentive for individuals to participate in a
task on the TaskCn site [19], in their later study they
found that higher a reward induces both greater
participation and higher submission quality [5]. The
importance of monetary incentives have been
identified in other studies as well [20], [21] [22].
Boudreau et al. found a significant relationship
between cash incentives and continuous level of effort
of individuals, but they could not find a significant
relationship between cash incentives and the
individuals choice to participate or the relationship of
cash incentives and collaboration across team
members [23].
Brabham in his qualitative study, based on the
interviews with 23 Next Stop Design project’s
participants, found that learning new skills and
knowledge, career advancement and peer recognition
(delayed payoff), contributes to collaborative effort
(community-based motivation), and having fun
(enjoyment based motivation) are motivators for
individuals’ participation in that project [24]. Brabham
in another qualitative study based on 17 interviews
with members of the crowd at Threadless found five
primary motivators for participation at Threadless: the
opportunity to make money (immediate payoff), the
opportunity to develop one’s creative skills (delayed
payoff), the potential to take up freelance work
(delayed payoff), the love of community at Threadless
and addiction (community based motivation) [25].
Brabham in his qualitative study found that the
opportunity to make money is a motivator for
individuals’ participation [25].
Some researchers went beyond the motivation
theory to examine other factors that affect individuals’
participation in crowdsourcing contests. These factors
are classified into four main categories: (1) taskspecific factors (reward, task type, task complexity,
and contest duration for task, etc.) [5], [7], [26]–[30];
(2) individual-specific factors (extrinsic motivations,
intrinsic motivations, individuals’ strategy, and
individuals’ experience) [4], [7], [27], [29], [31], [32];
(3) environment-specific factors (competitors’ rating,
number of competitors, number of super-star
competitors, number of non-super-star competitors,
collaboration) [33]–[35]; and (4) organization-specific
factors (brand-strength and marketplace maturity)
[36].
Most of the previous studies concentrated on the
factors affecting individuals’ initial participation in
crowdsourcing and did not distinguish between initial
and sustained participation. However, Sustaining the
individuals’ participation is essential to the success of
crowdsourcing [37]. Sun et al. in a field survey with
205 subjects in TaskCn found that extrinsic and
intrinsic
motivations
significantly
influence

individuals’ sustained participation [12]. They also
found that task complexity negatively moderates the
relationship between extrinsic motivation on sustained
participation and self-efficacy positively moderates
the relationship between intrinsic motivation and
sustained participation [12]. Studies have argued that
individuals felt rewarded for their participation when
they receive feedback from the requesters regardless
of whether their solution was selected or not [37]. This
kind of reward (non-financial- knowledge acquisition,
enhancing skills, having fun, and sense of
accomplishment) gives the impression that future
success is possible and strongly affect the chance of
future participation by individuals [37]. Boons et al. in
their field study found that feeling of pride drive
ongoing member activity in crowdsourcing platforms
[38]. Platform management by engaging in
communication practices can increase members’
feelings of pride and respect [38], [39]. Feller also
found that the periodic success or a belief that future
success is possible strongly influence the chance of
future participation by individual innovators [37].
Previous study on Kaggle platform indicates that
individuals who receive more attention from another
members tend to come back and maintain their
knowledge sharing in the platform [40].
In this paper we focus on crowdsourcing contests
that have both collaborative and competitive
components. We investigate the effect of individuals’
community activities, team activities, and their tenure
on their sustained participation in crowdsourcing
contests.

3. The Theoretical Background and
Hypothesis Development
3.1 Community activities and continued
participation in the contests
Intrinsic motivation has been shown to have an
important role in facilitating crowd’s participation in
crowdsourcing platforms [25]. One of the important
components of intrinsic motivation is community
based motivation. Community-based crowdsourcing
contests offer the possibilities of knowledge sharing
and collaboration among the individuals [4]. In these
community-based contests, individuals collaborate
while simultaneously compete with each other to
submit the best idea or design and win the contests
[35]. The effectiveness of a collaboration and
competition coexistence approach has been supported
by previous studies [35], [41].
In crowdsourcing communities, ideas and
solutions are shared among members via posting
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topics, commenting on the topics, and sometimes
sharing part of or the whole solutions. This knowledge
sharing behavior allows individuals to communicate,
interact, discuss, and share their ideas [4]. Individuals
who actively interact with other members in
crowdsourcing communities, tend to feel a greater
sense of community and take their contributions more
seriously [4]. We hypothesize that individuals who
share their knowledge with the other members of the
community and have interaction with them are more
willing to contribute to the future contests as well. This
discussion is summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis
1:
individuals’
continued
participation in the contests is positively related to
their community interactions.

3.2
Team
activities
and
participation in the contests

continued

Previous literature on teamwork indicates that by
teaming up individuals can evolve their knowledge
and expertise rapidly [42]. Highly specialized
professionals need teaming up with other people to
carry out integrative development projects [42].
Teamwork has a critical role in creating psychological
safety in teams that face significant learning
challenges [43]. Literature on teamwork on virtual
communities also shows that teamwork expands
individuals’ perspectives of problems [44], [45].
Thus, individuals’ teamwork activities will improve
their expertise level which results in self-efficacy [12]
and sustained participation. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis
2:
individuals’
continued
participation in the contests is positively related to
their team activities

3.3 Individuals’ tenure and
participation in the contests

continued

Research on organizational employees show that
employee’s tenure (length of time on the job) has
negative relationship with their turnover (Mobley et
al.). Research on online customer community
indicates that bidders became more selective in their
behavior as a result of their experience in online
communities. Therefore, their participation in online
communities has null or negative effect on individuallevel bidding volume [46]. Crowdsourcing contests
are different from traditional organizations’
environment and as the individuals’ tenure increases,
they gain more experience and become selective in
choosing contests to participate in. Specially, in
crowdsourcing contests that include collaboration
element, individuals have more chance to interact with

other members of the community, receive feedback on
their content, and understand the weakness and
strength of their content [40]. The individuals spend
some time for learning from the community and
increasing their knowledge. Therefore, we
hypothesize that it takes longer time for individuals to
find an appropriate contest to participate in. This
discussion is summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis
3:
individuals’
continued
participation in the contests is negatively related to
their tenure.

4. Research Methodology
4.1

Empirical
Kaggle.com

Context:

Contests

at

Data for this study comes from Kaggle.com, a
web-based platform for data science competitions in
which crowd of people compete to produce the best
models for predicting and describing the datasets.
Kaggle competitions are open to all data scientists
registered on the site and for competitions the rewards
vary from $0 to $500,000 depending on the contest.
Since its launch in 2010, Kaggle has served many
companies, including General Electric, Allstate,
Merck, Ford, and Facebook [47]. In April 2015,
Kaggle implemented the first version of their Kernels
product in their platform. Kernels allow users to write,
run, and publically share their code on Kaggle. This
product helps members to communicate with each
other, share their solutions, and receive feedback from
the other members.

4.2 Data collection and analysis
For this study, we collected data on the Kaggle’s
public contests since the launch of the platform in
April 2010 through August 2016. Since Kaggle
implemented Kernels in the platform in April 2015, we
only considered the contests from April 2015 to
August 2016 that include Kernels. Our final sample
include 2155 observations which consists of 875 users
that participated in 23 contests, and each user has
attended at least 2 contests of the 23 contests in the
dataset.

4.3 Variable measurement
To test our hypothesis, we measured the
dependent variable (continued participation) and
independent variables (community activities, team
activities, and tenure). The variables are summarized
and described in Table1.
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Table 1. Variable descriptions
Variables
Variable descriptions
Continued
The number of days that have
participation
passed from the individual’s
last participation in the
competition until the current
participation.
Community
The total number of the votes
activities
that the individual has
received for solution sharing
activities in the last
competition
Team activities
The number of team members
that the individual has had in
the last competition
Tenure
The number of days that have
passed from the individual’s
registration date in the
platform until the current
competition

5. Research Model and Results
5.1 Dependent variables and Independent
variables
The dependent variable in this analysis is the
number of days that have passed from the individual’s
last participation in the competition until the current
participation. “Recent total votes” (community
activities), “recent team members” (team activities),
and “Tenure” are the three covariates for testing the
hypothesis, which are described in Table1.
Four other variables are included as control
variables for model adjustment. We controlled for
current competition’s “prize”, namely the amount of
the prize for the competition measured in $10,000.
This variable is included because the literature
identified monetary reward as one of the important
motivators for individuals’ participation in
crowdsourcing contests [25]. We controlled for the
“number of competitors” (the number of teams
competing for the contest) since the literature shows
individuals react negatively to an increase in the total
number of competitors [33]. We controlled for
“previous performance” (the rank the individual’s
team received in the previous competition). The
literature indicates that the individual’s performance
can affect her/his self-efficacy. Sun et al. in their study
on crowdsourcing showed that self-efficacy moderates
the relationship between motivation and sustained
participation [12]. We also controlled for the
competition “duration” because duration is one of the

factors that have received considerable attention in
crowdsourcing research that affects individuals’
participation in crowdsourcing contests [36].

5.2 Analysis
Poisson regression models have been widely
used in information systems to account for the discrete
and non-negative nature of the response variable with
count data [48]–[51]. However, the Poisson
distribution requires that the variance to be equal to the
mean of the response variable. In this study, the
variance of the response variable is much larger than
the mean of the response variable. In order to
overcome the restriction of equi-dispersion that is
imposed by the Poisson model, the Negative Binomial
Model was used. Therefore, the continued
participation, which is measured by the number of
days between two competitions can be presented as:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝐶 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒
+𝛽7 ∗ (
)
10000
+∈)
To investigate the robustness of the findings, we
use an alternative to the Negative Binomial regression
model by categorizing the response variable into a
number of classes, depicted in Table 2, and use ordinal
logistic regression. Ordinal logistic regression requires
that the potential values of the independent variables
have a natural ordering [48]. More specifically, we
converted the dependent variable “continuous
participation” to an ordinal variable with 4 categories
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Ordinal variable for “Continuous
participation”
continued participation
days
level
days<=30

0

30< days<=60

1

60<days<=90

2

90< days

3
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5.3 Results
The results for the Negative Binomial model in
Table 3 show that the recent total votes and recent
number of team members are not statistically
significant contributors to individuals’ continued
participation. In another word, there is no evidence
that if an individual is highly active in a contest’s
kernels and has received high number of votes for
his/her kernels is motivated to participate in another
contest after a short period of time. Moreover, if an
individual attended a competition as a team with many
team members, it does not meaningfully inspire the
individual to come back quickly to participate in
another competition. Therefore, receiving votes and
having more team members does not increase
individuals’ sustained participation. Therefore, the
hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported by these results.
However, we found a significant positive relationship
between the continued participation and tenure, which
means if an individual has longer tenure and thus has
been on the platform for a longer time, he/she will be
less inclined to participate in another competition in a
short period of time. Therefore, increased tenure is
associated with returning to competitions less
frequently. Thus, Hypotheses 3 is supported by these
results. Moreover, all control variables, i.e., the
amount of the competition prize, the number of
competitors, previous performance, and competition
duration have significant effect on the individuals’
continued participation. These findings are consistent
with the previous studies on crowdsourcing contests
and highlight the importance of contest-specific and
individual-specific
factors
on
individuals’
participation.
Table 3. Results from Negative Binomial Model
Variable
Coefficient
p value
Recent total votes
0.0014
0.569
Recent team
members
-0.0003
0.533
Tenure
0.0002
<0.001 ***
Prize
-0.0248
0.016**
Number of
competitors
0.0001
<0.001***
Previous
performance
1.2218
<0.001***
Duration
0.0052
<0.001***
Note: Dependent variable: Continued Participation
* Level of significance: p < 0.1.
**Level of significance: p < 0.05.
***Level of significance: p < 0.001

The results from the ordinal logistic regression,
depicted in Table 4, are consistence with the findings
from the Negative Binomial model. We found a
significant positive relationship between the continued
participation and tenure. We also found that a higher
amount of competition prize, a lower number of
competitors, a better ranking in previous competitions,
and shorter competition duration are all associated
with individual coming back more frequently to
participate in the platform’s competitions.
Table 4. Results from Ordered Logistic
Regression
Variable
Coefficient
p value
Recent total votes
0.0011
0.569
Recent team
-0.00003
0.533
members
Tenure
0.0003
<0.001 ***
Prize
-0.011
<0.001***
Number of
0.0001
<0.001***
competitors
Previous
1.6493
<0.001***
performance
Duration
0.0147
<0.001***
Note: Dependent variable: Continued Participation
* Level of significance: p < 0.1.
**Level of significance: p < 0.05.
***Level of significance: p < 0.001

6. Conclusions
6.1 Discussion and Implications
The objective of this study was to determine the
factors affecting individuals’ sustained participation in
crowdsourcing contests. In contrary with hypothesis 1,
our findings indicate that there is no statistically
significant
relationship
between
individuals’
community activities and continued participation. One
explanation could be that the individuals who are
active in the community and share their solution with
the community are in the learning stage and they do
not want to get involved with the competitions until
they acquire the skills and knowledge that enable them
to compete with the other teams. Also, in contrary with
hypothesis 2, the relationship between “team
activities” and continued participation is not
statistically significant. The number of teammates that
an individual had in the previous competition does not
affect his/her continued participation in the
competitions. We hypothesized that the individual
tends to come back earlier because he/she liked the
experience of working in a larger team and learning
from teammates. One possible explanation for the
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contrary results could be that not every team member
actually contributes to the teamwork and thus these
individuals probably did not have a good experience
from teaming up and did not benefit from the
teamwork.
We found a statistically significant relationship
between “tenure” and continued participation. While
in the traditional organizations, employees with longer
tenure are more motivated to continue their job, our
findings show that in crowdsourcing contests
individuals with longer tenure take longer time to
come back to the platform and continue their
participation in the other contests. One explanation for
this finding is that tenured individuals are more
selective in choosing the contests to participate in, and
based on their experience on the platform they
participate in contests that align with their skills and
where they can perform better.
For control variables, we found a statistically
significant effect of the amount of the monetary prize
on individuals’ continued participation. Even though
many teams compete with each other in Kaggle
competitions and the chance of winning is very low,
the amount of the monetary prize is an important
incentive for individuals to continue their
participation. The amount of a prize motivates
individuals although they see low chance for winning
the contests. This is similar to more people buying
lottery tickets when the payout gets larger even though
the chance of winning in the lottery is very small.
We also found a statistically significant
relationship between competition duration and
continued participation, namely, the longer a
competition’s duration, the less inclined individuals
are to come back to the platform and participate in the
competition. This could be due to a burnout effect
when participating in a long competition.
We also found a statistically significant
relationship between the “number of competitors” and
continued participation. This indicates that as the
competitiveness of the contests increase individuals
are less willing to continue their participation.
We also found significant relationship between
previous performance and continued participation.
The results indicate that having low performance in a
previous competition is associated with longer time
between participations in the contests. The explanation
for this finding is that when individuals’ performance
is not good, their perceived ability and competence to
accomplish tasks diminishes, therefore it will take
them a longer time to come back to the platform and
participate in the contests.
This research has interesting and valuable
theoretical and managerial implications. Prior research
have demonstrated the importance of the individuals’

sustained participation and quality of submissions to
the success of crowdsourcing processes. Although
there is considerable research that examined
individuals’ participation in crowdsourcing contests
and the factors that affect their participation on these
platforms, most of them have been mostly silent on
identifying the factors affecting individuals’ sustained
participation in crowdsourcing contests, specifically
the contests that have both collaborative and
competitive components.
Our research results highlight the importance of
individual-specific and contest-specific factors on
individuals’ sustained participation. Our research
suggest that crowdsourcing platform sponsors should
focus on reducing the competition duration and
increase the amount of prize to attract more
participants, especially participants who are new on
the platform. Moreover, individuals should be
motivated to submit quality solutions because their
performance influences their continued participation.
The crowdsourcing platforms should be designed in a
way that facilitates individuals’ connection with more
experienced participants in order to motivate their
sustained participation in the contests.
6.2 Limitation and Future Research
This study contains some limitations that
influence the potential generalizability of our findings.
First, while there are many crowdsourcing platforms,
our study only considers one platform, namely Kaggle.
In order to generalize our findings, research on other
platforms would be needed. For example, InnoCentive
only offers single competition and Topcoder only
allows at most 20 people in a competition. The
restrictions on other platforms are different from
Kaggle’s platform, and thus results might be different.
Second, researchers can explore more factors that may
affect individuals’ sustained participation in contests.
For instance, the competition types and the contents of
competitions may be associated with continued
participation of individuals. Third, many factors may
affect
individuals’
continued
participation.
Crowdsourcing platform sponsors can focus on the
effect size of each factor in order to select and design
competitions
to
increase
participation.
Despite these limitations, this paper makes an
important contribution to theory and practice. It
provides empirical evidence that receiving more votes
from kernel submission for a competition and
attending competition as a team with more members
do not necessarily contribute to individuals’ continued
participation. However, reducing the duration of
competitions and increasing the prize amount offer
opportunities to increase participation.
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